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Imperialism is no word for scholars.
W.K. Hancock, Wealth of Colonies (Cambridge, 1950) 1 
Unlike the French and the Iberian, Dutch and English imperialists en-
countered non-European legal systems without having to take a position 
on just war, forced conversion, slavery, or non-Christians’ right to property 
and sovereignty. Their system secured non-European cooperation and saved 
economic and ideological costs of commercial and colonial expansion. It 
enabled, structured, and sustained the British Empire before the nineteenth-
century retheologisation of imperialism. Long recognised as a landmark in 
the history of customary international law and the law of the sea, Selden’s 
Mare clausum is both an iconic and synecdochal case of the secularisation 
of law that created soft imperialism. This article’s aim is to propose Mare 
clausum as the beginning of imperialist international law. 
I. Introduction
I.1. Exordium and Claim
Eminent lawyers like the Italian Andrea Alciato (1492–1550) and Alberico 
Gentili (1552–1608), the French Jacques Cujas (1520–1590) and Étienne 
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Pasquier (1529–1615), and the Dutch Petrus Cunaeus (1586–1638) and Hugo 
Grotius (1583–1645), responded to the seemingly interminable Wars of 
Religion by gradually deconstructing the biblical foundations of law.1 The 
secularising projects built on their work were suppressed after the Council 
of Trent, St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, and the Synod of Dordt, re-
spectively. Their legal method, concepts and arguments prompted Selden, 
Hobbes, Harrington and other English thinkers to reprioritise natural over 
divine law, and secularise law, the state, and civil society. Their intention 
was to create domestic political stability; an unintended consequence was 
an advantage in ‘soft imperialism.’2 
Contrary to Iberian and French colonial projects, some Dutch and 
English thinkers worked out a way to encounter native rulers and legal 
systems without a pressing need to take a position on issues like just war, 
missionary obligation, forced conversion, slavery, or non-Christians’ right 
to property and sovereignty. The new system proved effective in securing 
non-European cooperation and saving the economic and ideological costs 
of non-secular commercial and colonial expansion. It created, structured, 
and maintained the British Empire before the nineteenth-century rethe-
ologisation of imperialism. Long recognised as a landmark in the history of 
customary international law and the law of the sea, Selden’s Mare clausum 
(MC) is both an iconic and synecdochal case of the secularisation of law 
that enabled soft imperialism. Two features cause this: Selden’s secularisation 
of thirteen centuries of Christian international law, and his formulation of 
British exceptionalism. Both rely on his unprecedented elevation of history 
into both the ultimate source and method in finding out what the law is.
This article presents MC as the birth of the legal foundations of modern 
imperialism. Demonstranda categories include Selden’s reformulation of 
all property as de facto private; of state sovereignty as including effective 
and legal control over territorial seas; the possibility of expanding the seas 
1) Mark Somos, Secularisation and the Leiden Circle (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
2) For an influential statement of the softness of British imperialism see J.R. Seeley, The 
Expansion of England (London: Macmillan, 1883). “Soft” features of an empire include an 
organic state; a shared sense of identity; provincial rulers aspiring to emulate metropolitan 
elites; a continued role for local courts, traditions and government. See C.L. Tomlins, ‘Legal 
Communications and Imperial Governance: British North America and Spanish America 
Compared,’ in C.L. Tomlins and M. Grossberg (eds), Cambridge History of Law in America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), vol. 1, pp. 104–143.
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subject to sovereign control indefinitely when reason of state is expanded to 
include global trade; the formulations of British exceptionalism that became 
a template for Danish, Swedish, American, Prussian and other claims; and 
the secularisation of public international law. 
Recognition is another pertinent legal category.3 Although Las Casas 
(1484–1566), Vitoria (1492–1546) and others were notably humane, ‘the 
other’ in their legal system (often called “Saracen” even when referring to 
New World inhabitants) was inferior in one way or another.4 Classifications 
of newly encountered actors, including classifications of sovereignty, posed 
to the Iberians a particular subset of challenges of this type.5 By contrast, 
secularised natural law applied to everyone equally, whether immediately 
or at a future stage of development. In the latter case, the natives depicted 
as being at a lower stage of development ‘imposed’ trusteeship and obli-
gations of development on their colonisers. It is possible to compare this 
relationship with the non-secularised set of obligations of conversion and 
Christian re-education. Yet the markers of developmental stages proposed by 
Christian imperialism – conversion, baptism, specific ecclesiastical institu-
tions, etc. – were less acceptable than the hallmarks of capacity and right 
for self-governance that were posited by secularised imperialism, including 
settlement, advanced modes of production, political institutions, and other 
developmental criteria which, however Eurocentric, were at least tangible 
and empirical.6 Such markers seemed less autocratic and indeterminate 
than those afforded by ius gentium tied to Christian principles. The colonial 
discourse created by secularised natural law thus proved easier to establish 
3) Tarik Kochi, The Other’s War: Recognition and the Violence of Ethics (London: Routledge, 
2009). 
4) Compare Stephen Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1991), p. 135. Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought 
and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001). Randall Lesaffer, 
‘Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive 
Prescription,’ European Journal of International Law 16 (2005), pp. 25–58, reminds Anghie 
that Vitoria’s natural law remained Christian. 
5) C.H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), chapter 2. 
6) Hugo Grotius ‘Reply to Welwod,’ in idem, The Free Sea (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 
[ca. 1615] 2004), pp. 83–87.
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and maintain than the colonialism of Christian divine law.7 Compared with 
Iberian and French, it made English and Dutch imperialism highly effective 
by eliminating the economic and ideological cost of non-secular (whether 
Catholic or Protestant) commercial and colonial undertakings. 
However, a little hindsight is dangerous. Legal historians must entertain 
the possibility of unintended consequences. The English colonial advantage 
of secularising law appears less the achievement of omniscient and omnipres-
ent proto-capitalist oppressive states than a corollary of the secularisation 
first performed to secure domestic stability, including the renegotiation of 
the powers of clergy, and the contestation of sources of law and the legal 
theory of property. To analyse the interconnected nature and development 
of the secularisation of law, the state, and the early modern British Empire, 
it is insufficient but necessary to trace the secularising techniques in the 
iconic Mare clausum. 
I.2. Method
Another word of caution is in order. It is counterproductive to reduce 
secularisation to commercial interests. In a pop-Marxist variant, the moral 
principles enshrined in Christianity are said to have been abandoned by a 
greedy military-mercantilist-political nexus skilled in the use of legal am-
biguity. Such accounts point to men like John Hawkins (1532–95), Martin 
Frobisher (1535/9–1594), Francis Drake (1540–96) and Walter Raleigh 
(1554–1618), who ran discovery, privateering, commercial and colonial ad-
ventures under the aegis of both Crown and corporations. The corporation 
could deflect to the Crown, and vice versa, frustrating legal challenges. It has 
been argued that the semi-public, semi-private nature of their enterprises 
was eminently suited to early colonialism’s evasion of legal accountability.8 
Additionally to positing efficient long-term conspiracies and revealing a 
shallowness of morals by assuming, instead of proving, the reducability of 
all things to greed, these arguments invert the Whig theory of Protestant 
progress and preserve its flaws by conflating Dutch and English imperialism. 
7) Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-
Century International Law,’ Harvard International Law Journal 40:1 (1999), pp. 1–71, esp. 
pp. 46–51. Another perspective in Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire and the Idea of Human 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
8) China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Leiden: 
Brill, 2005), pp. 197–224, esp. pp. 200–208. 
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Dutch state-formation and colonial and commercial expansion were in-
tertwined from the start; the English had a long, distinctly private phase 
before the creation of the East India Company (1600–1874) and the Crown 
grant of monopolies. It is as unhistorical to attribute the success of both 
English and Dutch early colonialism to the cooperation of governments 
and corporations as it is counter-productive to overdraw the interaction 
between secularisation and state-building, or secularisation and successful 
colonialism, by either state.9 
One popular, and obviously limited, heuristic device for constructing 
explanations without over-defined origin myths for imperialism is to posit 
‘moments.’ Machiavellian, Gentilian, Vitorian, and Grotian genealogies 
of international law exist.10 All have adherents, opponents, and modifiers 
proposing sub-varieties. This article suggests the ‘Seldenian moment’ as a 
useful alternative. 
9) Jonathan Scott, ‘What the Dutch Taught Us: The Late Emergence of the Modern 
British State,’ Times Literary Supplement (16 March 2001), pp. 4–6. idem, Commonwealth 
Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 41. J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Atlantic Republican Tradition: The Republic of the 
Seven Provinces,’ Republics of Letters 2(1) (2010), pp. 1–10, at p. 3. See also Alexandrowicz, 
op. cit., p. 42, and Anthony Pagden, ‘Law, Colonization, Legitimation, and the European 
Background,’ in Tomlins & Grossberg, op. cit., pp. 1–31. 
10) Machiavellian: J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Political Thought and the At-
lantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Critically examined 
for early English imperialism: D.B. Quinn, ‘Renaissance Influences in English Colonization,’ 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (1976), pp. 73–93. Gentilian: B. Kingsbury and 
B. Straumann, ‘Introduction,’ in idem (eds) The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: 
Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 2010). Vitorian: Antony 
Anghie, ‘Francisco De Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law,’ Social and 
Legal Studies 5(3) (1996), pp. 321–336. Grotian: Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition 
in International Law,’ British Year Book of International Law 23 (1946), pp. 1–53; Hedley Bull, 
The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977); idem, 
‘The Importance of Grotius,’ in idem et al (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 95–131; Edward Keene, ‘The Reception of Hugo Grotius 
in International Relations Theory,’ Grotiana 20/21 (2000), pp. 135–158. Overviews of ‘the 
Grotian moment’ are in C. Cutler, ‘The Grotian Tradition,’ Review of International Studies 
17 (1991), pp. 41–65.
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II. Mare Clausum: Erastianism, Parliamentarianism, Soft Imperialism 
and the Secularisation of Law
The ends of this voyage are these:
1. To plant Christian religion. 2. To trafficke. 3. To conquer. Or, to doe all three. 
To plant Christian religion without conquest, wil bee hard. Trafficke easily 
followeth conquest: conquest is not easie. Trafficke without conquest seemeth 
possible, and not uneasie. What is to be done, is the question.
Pamphlet for the Virginia Enterprise by Richard Hakluyt, lawyer, 1584. 
In: Hakluyt, R. and R., The Original Writings & Correspondence of the Two Richard 
Hakluyts, ed. E.G.R. Taylor (London: Hakluyt Society, 1935) 332.
II.1. The Four Lives of Mare Clausum (1616?-1621, 1630–1635, 1652, 1663)
MC has a remarkable publication history even by seventeenth-century 
standards. From 1616 to 1663, under James VI/I, Charles I, Cromwell, 
then Charles II, MC addressed enduring concerns including the Civil 
War, mercantilism, the government’s right to tax for defense, and its right 
to identify emergency. It was first drafted in response to the publication 
of Grotius’s Mare liberum (ML, 1609), originally chapter 12 of De iure 
praedae commentarius (IPC).11 The whole IPC remained unpublished until 
1864. Hakluyt translated ML into English some time before his death in 
1616 (perhaps as early as 1609).12 Armitage dates MC to 1618; Toomer cites 
Selden’s Vindiciae to show that Selden decided to counter ML before 1618; 
Tuck posits 1616–7.13 Buckingham, recently made Lord Admiral, had Selden 
submit the draft MC to James for approval in the summer of 1619. Although 
approved, the court asked Selden to remove the final chapter on British 
11) On Selden and mercantilism see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 100. 
12) P.C. Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise: An Elizabethan’s Obsession for an English America (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 275.
13) David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 113. Tuck 1979, op. cit., p. 116. Welwod in 1613, and even Freitas 
in 1625, did not name Grotius as the author of ML, perhaps because they genuinely did 
not know. Fulton regards the second edition of ML, from 1618, as the official disclosure of 
Grotius’s authorship. W.T. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (Edinburgh: Blackwood and 
Sons, 1911), p. 342 fn 1. 
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claims in the North Sea, likely to offend James’s brother-in-law, Christian 
IV of Denmark. Selden was unable to gain access to Buckingham with the 
revised version, and MC vanishes from sight for a decade.14 
Bourgchier updated Ussher several times about Selden’s condition in 
Marshalsea Prison. In one of these letters, from June 1630, he informed 
Ussher that Selden was preparing MC for publication.15 Nothing more is 
heard until spring 1635 when, according to his Vindiciae, Selden was ap-
proached by unnamed noblemen with Charles I’s order to publish. Toomer 
confirms the date through diplomatic and academic chatter from April 1635 
on, including Samuel Johnson’s letter to Grotius in May. The revised manu-
script was submitted to Charles I, approved in August 1635, and published 
in November. Toomer adds,
Nevertheless, although the preceding account may accurately reflect the formal 
record of events, we cannot escape the suspicion that an informal agreement 
about the publication of Mare Clausum, as a condition of Selden’s release from 
bail, had been reached some time before.16
MC was closely tied to Stuart maritime policies, including claims to the 
adjacent seas, as well as ship money. As many point out, MC was cited in the 
1637 Ship-Money Case by Sir Edward Littleton and Sir John Banks, Crown 
lawyers and prosecutors of Hampden. Ascribing appeasement of Court as a 
motive to the imprisoned Selden, Fulton and Toomer agree that Bourgchier’s 
1630 report is credible, and revision may have begun as early as 1630. 
Toomer’s two points on the dating of MC’s revision, namely its con-
nection to Stuart claims to adjacent seas, and Selden’s appeasement of the 
Crown, neither support nor contradict each other. Selden’s revisitation 
of MC in 1630 could be connected to Charles’s third Parliament, 1628–9, 
rather than to Ship Money. A very brief overview of the much-discussed 
events is in order. The 1625 June-August so-called Useless Parliament 
granted Tonnage and Poundage to Charles I for a year, instead of life, as 
14) John Selden, Vindiciae… Maris Clausi (London: Bee, 1653). G.J. Toomer, John Selden: 
A Life in Scholarship (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009), p. 389.
15) James Ussher, The Whole Works of Ussher, ed. C.R. Elrington (Dublin: Hodges and Smith, 
[n.a.] 1847). Vol. xvi, p. 514. 
16) Toomer, op. cit., pp. 390–391. Fulton, op. cit., pp. 367–368.
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has been customary since the early fourteenth century. After a year Charles 
continued to collect this levy on wine and other goods, both exported and 
imported. The second Parliament of 1626 began with a litany of complaints 
against Buckingham and this illegal collection, leading Charles to attempt 
to adjourn the session. MPs famously held John Finch, the Speaker, in his 
chair until three resolutions were read, one of them condemning anyone 
who paid unauthorised Tonnage and Poundage as a traitor and enemy of 
England. This was Selden’s first Parliament, where he played a prominent 
role in attempts to impeach Buckingham. 
The abrupt dissolution of the second Parliament in June 1626 left Charles 
without subsidies. Forced loans and customs duties unauthorised by 
Parliament followed, causing deep resentment. Refusal to pay led to the im-
prisonment of seventy-six prominent men. They were held but not charged, 
for fear that the court would find against the king. Five of them applied 
for writs of habeas corpus, starting the Five Knights Case in which Selden’s 
defense of Edmund Hampden led to his own arrest. The third Parliament 
opened in 1628. Led by Selden, John Eliot, Edward Coke, Robert Phelips 
and Thomas Wentworth, it forced Charles to sign the famous Petition of 
Right, which limited Charles’s absolute prerogatives. The second session 
opened in January 1629 with parliamentary speeches against Arminianism, 
and Charles’s moderate speech defending Tonnage and Poundage. Parliament 
passed a resolution against the illegal levying of Tonnage and Poundage. 
Charles had the MPs who orchestrated this tumultuous process arrested, 
Selden among them. Selden was arrested on 4 March 1629 and held in the 
Tower for eight months, before being moved to Marshalsea Prison under 
less harsh conditions. 
The tenor and implication of MC’s covert and overt legal and ironic 
attacks on Charles’s taxes change, depending on whether their context is 
Tonnage and Poundage, or Ship Money. To my knowledge, the matter of 
what the advisable distance was for Selden from an Arminian like Grotius 
(given for instance the strong anti-Arminian sentiment of the third Parlia-
ment), and how this distance influenced Selden’s criticisms in MC regardless 
of his position on Grotius’s free sea arguments, has not been raised before. 
Perhaps it was politic, for instance, to cite DIBP strategically, and not to draw 
too much support from it for his anti-ML arguments, however tempting it 
was to dwell on Grotius’s changes of mind or emphasis from ML to DIBP. 
The second life of MC, its first actual publication in 1635, is complex and 
rich. Three unauthorised reprints appeared in Holland in 1636, prompting 
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Charles to ban their importation to England. The Dutch States General, 
and Grotius, independently encouraged Cunaeus to respond. The States 
General also commissioned Dirk Graswinckel (1600/1–66), who finished 
his draft by the end of 1636. Graswinckel was eminently suited to the task. 
A cousin and student of Grotius, Graswinckel was with him at Senlis when 
he was writing DIBP around 1623.17 Graswinckel already had a reputation 
as a polemicist favouring free seas. Libertas Veneta (1634) defended Venetian 
claims to trade freely.18 Soon after MC’s appearance, and before the States 
General commissioned him to draft an official response, he privately sent 
detailed criticisms to Selden.19 In 1636 the States General amply rewarded 
him for the finished work, but suppressed Vindiciae maris liberi adversus 
I.C. Janum Seldenum due to political concerns. Published responses chal-
lenged British dominion claims, set forth their own (e.g. Pontanus for 
Denmark over the Sound), but the genie was out of the bottle: there was no 
influential counter to Selden’s innovative justification of private dominion 
over the seas. Not only in England, the temptation of the argument proved 
irresistible. MC’s first appearance in 1635 is as convenient a birthday for the 
public international law of modern imperialism as one can hope to find.
The third life of Mare clausum begins in the 1650s, under a different regime 
facing similar problems. The English Commonwealth is at war with the 
United Provinces, but its disputes are similar to those pursued under James’s 
and Charles’s monarchy. The first published translation was Marchamont 
Nedham’s in 1652 under the title Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea 
(DOS).20 Nedham replaced Selden’s dedication to Charles with a dedica-
tion to Parliament, and added supplementary materials. This translation is 
considered generally faithful and accurate. As we will see, it introduces a 
few important changes to Selden’s text to fit the Cromwellian milieu.21 After 
17) Henk Nellen, Hugo de Groot. Een leven in strijd om de vrede 1583–1645 (Amsterdam: 
Balans, 2010), p. 307.
18) Tuck, 1979 op. cit., pp. 89–97. 
19) Tuck, 1979 op. cit., pp. 89–90. 
20) An earlier translation attempt by William Watts around 1636 was unsuccessful. Selden, 
Correspondence, pp. 104–105. Toomer, op. cit., pp. 345–349.
21) For the diplomatic rumour that Cromwell used MC to prepare his claim to becoming 
‘emperor of the seas occidentalis’ see Armitage, op. cit., pp. 119–120. The additions Selden 
may not have readily agreed with include the attachment of Ingenuis’s and others’ claims 
for Venetian dominion over the seas, which Selden disputed in MC.
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the Restoration, James Howell, Historiographer Royal, deleted Nedham’s 
deprecatory comments on Charles, restored Selden’s original dedication, 
and published the reworked translation in 1663.22 
MC’s direct policy impact can be traced until the 1830s. The above four 
lives of MC merely illustrate the endurance of its topicality and its continu-
ous use in the policies of otherwise starkly different British governments. 
II.2. Deconstructing Sources of Law: Bible and Human Reason
II.2.1. Origins of Global Private Property: Samaritan Pentateuch vs. 
Conventional Legal Loci
In Selden’s classification the universal laws of nations, or common laws of 
mankind, are either natural or divine.23 They are unchangeable, as shown 
by ancient philosophers (including Aristotle and Cicero), theologians 
(Aquinas), and lawyers. By contrast positive or civil law, “ordained either 
by God or men”, can change.24 It has two varieties: peculiar (to a nation or 
group), and what is “received by divers Nations.” The latter can bind nations 
either “jointly, equally, and indifferently, by som common obligation,” or ac-
cidentally. The jointly binding in turn is either imperative, or intervenient. 
The imperative (common) laws of diverse nations are special commands of 
an external authority, whether God or man. After citing classical instances 
in support, Selden adds Deut. 20:10, which according to him bound the 
Israelites by this force, not because God was their ruler. It equally bound 
the Canaanites, with whom they were to wage war. When several nations 
submit to the same papal command, they are likewise obeying an Impera-
tive Law of Nations.25
Through these distinctions Selden effectively diminishes the universality 
of all biblical precepts concerning international relations. Even when they 
apply (or have applied) universally, the reason they cannot be regarded as the 
universal law of nations is precisely because God ordained them positively, 
and is recorded in the Bible as having done so (as opposed, for instance, 
22) D.J. Padwa, ‘On the English Translation of John Selden’s Mare Clausum,’ American 
Journal of International Law 54:1 (1960), pp. 156–159.
23) DOS, I.iii.12.
24) DOS, I.iii.13.
25) DOS, I.iii.13–15.
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to making His will known through nature or conscience). Grotius uses the 
same method of subversion against legalistic uses of the Bible that create 
irresolvable conflicts by grounding their validity in open-endedly debatable 
exegetical problems. Interestingly, one of Grotius’s favourite passages to 
wreak havoc on is the same that Selden cites here. 
Deuteronomy 20:5–17 has always troubled lawyers. Here God tells the 
Israelites to kill all males in far-away cities, but take the women and children 
alive. In nearby places they wish to keep, they must kill everybody. This was 
hard to accept as a straightforward divine law. Vitoria joined a long list of 
thinkers who argued that this was a special command given under special 
circumstances.26 The Deuteronomy commands begin with military service 
dispensations for the dedication of new houses, vineyards, and sleeping 
with new wives. Unless women and grapes were to be obligatory considera-
tions before all wars, it was easy to show that the indiscriminate murder 
in Deut. 20 was speciali mandato Dei. Vitoria had no difficulty concluding 
that what God wanted understood as an universal rule was that civilians 
and non-combatants are protected, and the maximum reasonable degree 
of mercy must be shown at all times. By contrast, Grotius took Deut. 20, 
one of the most discussed and blood-thirsty Bible passages in the theory 
of war, and presented it as a straightforward law of nations.27 In MC, his 
response to Grotius, Selden picks the same passage to make a similar point, 
even though he has not seen the whole of IPC, only ML. Selden neutralises 
this key passage in the just war tradition slightly differently than Grotius, 
by redefining the types and hierarchy of laws it fits into. 
Yet Selden’s main concern in MC is not international relations but 
dominion. In I.iv he seems to distinguish between the enjoyment and 
dominion of property, and define the original community of property as 
26) Francisco Vitoria, ‘De Indis Posterior, sive de iure belli,’ in Relectiones theologicae XII 
(Lyons: Jacob Boyer, 1557), Vol. i, pp. 409–410.
27) IPC, iv, Q II in Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (ed. M.J. van Ittersum, Indi-
anapolis, IN: Liberty Press, [ca. 1603] 2006), p. 81. Further cases and details of Grotius’s use 
of Deut. 20.10–17 in Mark Somos, ‘Secularization in De iure praedae: From Bible Criticism to 
International Law,’ Grotiana 26–28 (2008), pp. 147–191. Cf. the contrast between Augustine’s, 
Aquinas’s and Calvin’s reading of another just war passage. Michael Walzer, ‘Exodus 32 and 
the Theory of Holy War: The History of a Citation,’ The Harvard Theological Review 61:1 
(1968), pp. 1–14. Walzer shows that a similar subversion of Augustine’s reading by Aquinas 
‘in effect denied the value of the citation altogether.’ He also argues that Grotius extended 
Aquinas’s trick into ‘a modernist parody of the medieval argument about the Old Law.’
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akin to the former. He begins by appealing to Lactantius’s Divine Insti-
tutes V.v to explain the classical accounts of an original communality of 
property as poetic license. Lactantius thinks that Cicero, Ovid, Virgil and 
Aratus were not referring to shared dominion in their descriptions of the 
golden age, but to a spirit of sharing and the common enjoyment of the 
Earth. To Lactantius’s comparison of these sources Selden adds Gen. 9:1–2, 
which he interprets not as a divine command, but a figurative donation of 
the world to Noah and his three sons, Shem, Cham and Japhet, to hold 
in common. To buttress the point that this was still a community without 
individual private property, Selden cites Justin on the Age of Saturn, and 
Cicero’s De Officiis and Ovid’s Metamorphoses on the golden days. Through 
a neutralisation of the established biblical loci, Selden presents all property 
as private. Instead of Grotius’s ML, Lauterpacht could have cited Selden’s 
MC to express his disagreement with nineteenth-century positivism and 
his agreement with the seventeenth-century lawyers who traced all public 
international law back to the expansion of private law, leaving no room for 
incompleteness and non liquet.28 
Selden cites Gen. 10:5 to 25 here, and allocates the three sons in geo-
graphical regions over which they “settled themselvs as private Lords.” Selden 
asserts that Noah had private dominion, revived after the Flood in the same 
form it was granted by God to Adam (Gen. 1:2, 28). Both patriarchs had 
exclusive full rights to the whole world, which they divided and passed on 
voluntarily. This is consistent with Selden’s earlier characterisation of ac-
counts of idyllic communities as poetic depictions of magnanimity. Cain 
built a city called Enoch, and settled. Commerce arose naturally, and in 
turn required contracts, judges, and boundary marks. Further divisions into 
smaller units of private dominion followed. Selden argues that universal 
law, whether natural or divine, permitted both the emergence of numerous 
private owners by extension of the voluntary bequests of universal dominion-
holders (like Adam and Noah), and the transformation of common rights 
to enjoyment into full-title dominion. Preparing his argument for exclusive 
British dominion over the seas, Selden thus argues that universal law is not 
the source of private property. 
28) Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (With Special 
Reference to International Arbitration) (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), pp. 72–87. 
Lesaffer, op. cit., p. 28.
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Instead, popular consent creates private property. By “the mediation of 
something like a compact, which might binde their posteritie,” public goods 
turn into private properties. Things that are not public are possessed by first 
occupation, unless a nation’s civil law appropriates them to the Prince.29 
Already in creating and structuring his distinctions one finds Selden sys-
tematically precluding some anti-imperialist arguments, whether by appeal 
to universal laws governing public goods, or to terra nullius. Res nullius are 
shown to be open to seizure by reference to “the Laws and Customs of the 
Hebrews and Mahometans, as well as the Christians,” giving “Misna & Gemara 
utraque tit. Baba metzia cap. I. & Maimonides tit. Zachia Wemishna cap. I.,” 
and “Alcoran, Azoar 12 de venatu; & Azoari 34” in support.30 In later editions 
of DIBP, at II.ii “De his quae hominibus communiter competunt” Grotius 
referred to “Selden, the glory of England” and to this evidence that Selden 
found for explicit agreements to transform common into private property.31 
Grotius’s celebrated reformulation of both ius naturae and ius gentium with 
a pragmatic view to imperialism owes the discovery and occupation of this 
common ground to Selden. 
Selden next directly faces the problem of transmission from the original 
community of property to a state of private ownership. In a speculative tone 
he posits that original title to terra and res nullius must have belonged to 
all mankind; therefore there must have been an original contract of some 
sort that instituted not so much property as the laws relating to its division, 
inheritance, and acquisition. This is why Grotius was right to locate the 
origin of property in express agreement for division, and in tacit agreement 
for seizure or first occupation (DIBP II.ii §2). As divine universal law and 
natural law are both permissive with regard to property, national variations 
could lawfully emerge after the world was divided into private dominions.32
But by virtue of that Universal Compact or Agreement (before mentioned) 
whereby things not yet possessed, were to becom the Proprietie of him that 
should first enjoie them by Occupation; hee that shall so possess them by 
29) DOS, I.iv.19–21.
30) DOS, I.iv.22.
31) DIBP, II.ii.v, p. 122 in the 1642 Amsterdam edition, author’s note. Tr. in ed. Richard 
Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 2005), p. 426. 
32) DOS, I.v.24, I.vi.41, I.xxi.130.
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Occupation, receiv’s the Island and Building as it were by a Surrender of 
Right from former Owners.33 
Unlike the universal and natural bodies of permissive positive law, the “due 
observation of Compacts and Covenants” remains an universal obligatory 
law that continues to underpin the permissive developments in property law, 
including division, inheritance, original occupation and, if so provided in a 
given state, even appropriation of still undiscovered lands to the Crown.34 
According to Selden, permissive development and obligatory observance 
of contracts fully account for the regulation of property in both land and 
sea. One of several sets of evidence for this is the assignment of sea as a 
boundary to land, as seen in Julius Africanus (from Eusebius’s Chronicle) 
for the Sons of Cham.
Selden’s next example for the permissive positive law of private property 
is Canaan, within the land of the Sons of Cham, described as stretching 
from the Nilus to the Euphrates “and unto the utmost Sea, or the remotest, 
which is the great or Western Sea.”35 By the latter Selden means not the 
Dead Sea, but the Persian Gulf. His source is a manuscript of the Samaritan 
Gen. 10:19 and Deut. 34:3. The cited “and unto the utmost sea” is from the 
latter verse, changed erroneously to 34:2 in Nedham’s translation. Conven-
tional biblical geography locates Cham’s lands in the Fertile Crescent, and 
the Canaanites as limited to modern-day Israel, just stretching into Jordan 
at the OT city of Lasha. By replacing the Jordan with the Euphrates as 
the other river, beside the Nile, that bordered Canaanite territory, Selden 
ascribes the whole Fertile Crescent to them. The deliberateness of this 
shift is confirmed when Selden continues by describing the land assigned 
to Japheth’s Sons as outside the Fertile Crescent, citing Num. 34:6–7 and 
34:12 (to which Nedham adds 34:3–5). However, Num. 34:2 explicitly refers 
to Canaan, and the others are conventionally interpreted to do likewise. 
Selden points out that Josh. 15 (:1–5) gives the same description of a region, 
divided out by Joshua; though he fails to mention that there it applies to the 
land of Judah’s progeny. Selden’s final biblical support in MC I.v for using 
seas as territorial boundaries is Ps. 72:8. Although the best support for his 
33) DOS, I.xxi.130.
34) DOS, I.v.24–5.
35) DOS I.v.25.
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argument, it is the only one that Selden simply includes in the marginalia, 
without discussion. Nedham’s changes are not corrections, but attempts to 
steer MC back toward conventional sacred geography.
Selden’s use of the Samaritan Pentateuch (SP) for Genesis and Deuter-
onomy here is striking. Although Jerome, Eusebius, Diodorus of Tarsus, 
Procopius, Cyril of Alexandria, Syncellus and others used and cited this 
Pentateuch, it later fell into oblivion. Scaliger was the first to reassert the 
SP’s importance in De emendatione temporum (1583), but his own prized 
manuscript was the Samaritan Chronicle, not the Pentateuch. Peiresc tried 
to obtain a copy, but the ship carrying it was captured by pirates.36 In mod-
ern times the first complete copy, dating from 1345/6 CE and now known 
as Codex B, was finally acquired in 1616 in Damascus by the redoubtable 
Pietro della Valle (1586–1652) and sent by de Sancy, then French ambassador 
to Constantinople, to the Oratorians in Paris in 1623. Its editio princeps is by 
Joannes Morinus (1591–1659) in LeJay’s 1628–1645 Polyglot (in vol. 6, 1645), 
from which Walton’s famous Polyglot reproduced it in 1657.37
SP played several roles in political and legal controversies until the nine-
teenth century. It was known that the Samaritans arose from Jewish and 
Gentile intermingling, and that Jews and Samaritans entertained cordial 
hostility to one another.38 Samaritans rejected all Jewish sacred texts except 
the Pentateuch, and raised a temple on Mount Gerizim to worship accord-
ing to Mosaic law. Among early modern Bible scholars it was popular to 
argue that the mutual hostility between Samaritans and Jews stopped all 
interaction; therefore the insignificance of textual variants between the Torah 
36) P.N. Miller, ‘A Philologist, a Traveller and an Antiquary Rediscover the Samaritans in 
Seventeenth-Century Paris, Rome and Aix: Jean Morin, Pietro della Valle and N.-C. Fabri 
de Peiresc,’ in H. Zedelhaimer & M. Mulsow (eds), Gelehrsamkeit als Praxis: Arbeitsweisen, 
Funktionen, Grenzbereiche (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001), pp. 123–146.
37) A. Schenker, ‘The Polyglot Bibles of Antwerp, Paris and London: 1568–1658,’ in M. Saebø 
(ed.), Hebrew Bible/ Old Testament: The History of its Interpretation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 2008), Vol. 2., pp. 774–784, esp. pp. 779–781. The project for this Polyglot 
was conceived by Cardinal du Perron and Jacques du Thou. Morin was invited in 1628. P. 
Gibert, ‘The Catholic Counterpart and Response to the Protestant Orthodoxy,’ in Saebø, 
ibid., pp. 758–773, at p. 768. Toomer, op. cit., p. 806, dates SP’s editio princeps in LeJay’s 
Polyglot, vol. vi, to 1632.
38) The usual early modern reference for this trope of Jewish-Samaritan hostility is Flavius 
Josephus. As he does with the Druids in his ‘Notes upon Fortescue’, Selden positions Flavius 
as a lawyer. DOS, I.xxiii, 149.
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and the SP was another proof of Moses’s authorship and the text’s faultless 
preservation throughout the millennia.39 Others focused on the differences 
and turned them to sectarian use.40 In light of these loaded debates sur-
rounding the SP, Selden’s reliance on the Samaritan version of Gen. 10:19 
and Deut. 34:3 is indicative of both his philological and his non-sectarian 
self-positioning, especially in an applied legal work like MC. 
His reliance on SP to redraw, on the one hand, sacred geography and, 
on the other hand, to reformulate the origins of private property, effectively 
sidestepped contemporary uses of the Bible in imperial debates. Had Selden 
proceeded to trace a genealogy of the Brits back to one of Noah’s sons, like 
many French lawyers did for the French, he could have easily constructed 
biblical justifications for the claim that they and they alone ended up – 
through inheritance, for instance – with full dominion over the seas. This, 
however, would have made him a chosen nation theorist, albeit of an expan-
sionist, imperialist variety.41 Instead, Selden made the biblical foundation 
of his account of property critical of existing biblical imperialisms, yet so 
contentious as to be unusable for chosen nation arguments.42
In sum, in MC I.v-vi Selden goes to great lengths to 1) establish biblical 
evidence for the use of seas as boundaries within which dominion applies; 
2) to make this biblical evidence as radically different as possible from the 
biblical exegeses used in the established pertinent legal tradition; and 3) to 
make the equation of the boundaries (which derived from his innovative 
biblical exegesis) with the territory, which is his clinching argument for pos-
sible dominion over the seas, depend not on biblical but on Roman legal 
commentaries. As SP has just become available for insertion in the legal 
tradition, his choice signalled that A) he regarded his treatment as original, 
and B) previous treatments (and therefore the conventional applications of 
the Bible to this issue) as inadequate. 
39) Toomer, op. cit., p. 245.
40) E.g. Johann Heinrich Hottinger (1620–1667) derived Protestant justifications from 
the Samaritan Pentateuch in Exercitationes Anti-Morinianae (Zurich, 1644). Also see Noel 
Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), pp. 418–419.
41) Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regum Britanniae (1136) shaped centuries of mythologi-
cal, at best quasi-Christian English identity claims, usually centering on Brutus, a refugee 
from the Trojan wars. 
42) Cf. Grotius’s techniques for neutralising the Bible in IPC, described in Somos, Secularisa-
tion, chapter 5. 
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II.2.2.  Natural-Permissive: The Unreasonable and Irreligious Common Law 
of Nations
Book I, chapter vii, of MC is about method. Therein Selden constructs an 
extraordinary source for what he calls the natural-permissive law or com-
mon law of nations. He showed earlier that positive laws, whether divine 
or natural, permit private dominion over the sea. The right use of reason 
(recto humano rationis; rectum Humanae rationis, MC I.29) reveals these 
laws. He now wants to show that natural-permissive laws, where reason 
has no place, equally permit private dominion over the seas. Selden clarifies 
and strengthens his distinction between these types of law by explaining 
that customs of several nations, the source of natural-permissive laws, are 
arbitrary, haphazard, and unrelated to reason. Correct natural-permissive 
laws can be deduced from an observation and comparison of customs, which 
vary across nations and across the ages.43 Religious truths, however, cannot. 
Citing Antisthenes from Cicero’s De natura deorum I, “That there are many 
national gods, but only one natural,” Selden continues,
So that as of old in the Jewish Church, so also in the Christian, the use of 
humane Reason among the vulgar, though free in other things, yet when it 
dived into the contemplation or debate of Religious matters, it hath often been 
most deservedly restrained, by certain set-Maxims, Principles, and Rules of 
holy Writ, as Religious Bolts and Bars upon the Soul; lest it should wantonize 
and wander, either into the old Errors of most Ages and Nations, or after the 
new devices of a rambling phansie. And truly, such a cours as this hath ever 
been observed in Religious Government.44 
Since religious lawgiving is necessary, and works by putting bolts and bars 
upon the soul to regulate behaviour, all religious laws must be ignored when 
finding natural-permissive law. Reason must likewise be ignored, because 
religious lawgivers are right about reason being fallible. All that is left to 
deduce natural-permissive law from is history. From history one can glean the 
common law of nations by examining customs, which in turn might be best 
43) See also Selden, ‘Notes upon Fortescue,’ to chapter XVII, 7–22 in Fortescue, De Laudibus 
Legem Angliae, with Ralph de Hengham, Two Summes (London, 1616).
44) DOS, I.vii.43.
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reflected in bodies of civil law. With reason, religion, and antiquity shown 
as unreliable sources, one wonders what natural law Selden allows for.45
Yet on closer inspection, the permissive natural laws regulating non-
religious affairs are not much simpler. Selden reverts to the skepticism we 
find in the History of Tithes when in MC he cites Justinian and Gaius, who 
posit a “natural reason” that manifests in the law of nations, followed by 
all.46 Selden retorts: where are these nations, which laws are in common, and 
how can natural reason accommodate the necessary evolution of laws? For 
instance, landbound states have no customary law that informs the natural 
law of the sea; and the enslavement of prisoners is no longer practised by 
Christians, though it is by Muslims. No law can be gathered from inspecting 
and comparing the customs of nations.47 Selden’s skepticism is unlike that of 
Montaigne, Charron or their many readers. From accounts of civilisations 
radically different from their own, including ancients and in extremis can-
nibals, they stoically surmised the contingency of their moral and religious 
norms.48 Selden’s maxim in MC about the inapplicability of laws, derived 
from comparing however many civilisations, belongs not to this brand of 
early modern skepticism, but to the rise of a body of affirmative, imperialist 
positive law of nations (justified, as we will see, with reference to the best 
legal practices in historical situations and nations that Selden deems civi-
lised). Selden’s claims in MC that legal history shows that British common 
law applies globally follows from this skeptical blow to natural law. It was 
appreciated by Selden’s non-English followers as such when they adopted 
his reasoning to vindications of their own exclusive dominions over the sea. 
The importance of this point cannot be overemphasised. It is often noted 
that the fifteenth century saw a shift away from Christianity due to lawyers’ 
45) Tuck 1979, op. cit., pp. 84–85 and 95, for the secularising implications of this move, both 
in terms of Erastianism and emptying divine law. 
46) John Selden, The Historie of Tithes… (London: William Stansby, 1618), Preface xiii, and 
passim.
47) DOS, I.vii.43–5.
48) M. Montaigne, ‘On cannibals,’ in idem, Essays (London: Penguin, ([1580] 1958), pp. 
105–119. M. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Phila-
delphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), pp. 358–382. Anthony Pagden, The Fall 
of Natural Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1–14, 27–38, 51–103, 
114–135. Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), chapters 2–4.
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invocation of Roman law as the model for, virtually the entire content of, 
reformulated natural law. 49 Three well-known instances are the genealogical 
and analogical connection between private and public property and contract; 
occupation of terra nullius; and acquisitive prescription. Many, including 
Grotius, argued that international law arose from Roman private law.50 
Related to this development, it has also been argued that the Renaissance 
and early modern resurrection of the Roman law gradually institutionalised 
an advantage for strong unitary sovereignty. 51 Though somewhat liberating 
from post-Reformation Christianity, the model and laws of ancient Rome 
could become stifling. As Lesaffer points out, 
With time, the writers of the modern law of nations as well as their civil law 
counterparts became more critical of Roman law and found more instances 
of situations in which Roman law did not provide the most reasonable or just 
solution. A new criterion for the application or not for Roman law emerged: 
reason. Though Roman law often proved to encompass this, it not always did.52
49) P.C. a Vlissingen, De evolutione definitionis juris gentium: Studium historico-juridicum de 
doctrina juris gentium apud Auctores Classicos Saec. XVI-XVIII (Rome: n.a., 1940). Laurens 
Winkel, ‘Problems of Legal Systematization from De iure praedae to De iure belli ac pacis,’ 
in H.W. Blom (ed.), Property, Piracy and Punishment (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 61–78, esp. 
pp. 73–74. 
50) Famously, this inspired Hersch Lauterpacht. Schmitt points out that the early modern 
lawyers who handled the problem of land appropriation along these lines missed the point 
that unlike the French, Dutch and English conquests, the Spanish ‘was not at all private 
and, to this extent, was purely a matter of public law.’ Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth 
(New York, NY: Telos, [1950] 2006), p. 138 n7.
51) This draws on, but can also stand irrespective of, the old historiographical convention 
of describing the centralising uses of Roman law by “new monarchs” like Charles VII of 
France, Henry VII of England, or Ferdinand and Isabella. See e.g. C.J. Friedrich, The Age 
of the Baroque, 1610–1660 (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1952). A.J. Slavin, The New 
Monarchies and Representative Assemblies (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath, 1964). R.H. Helmholz, 
Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
A balanced account is G. Butler, ‘Roman Law and the New Monarchy in France,’ English 
Historical Review 35:137 (1920), pp. 55–62. Although they are reconcilable, to an extent the 
“Military Revolution” topos in the post-1960s historiography of early modern states displaced 
this account of Roman law as the chief instrument of centralisation.
52) Lesaffer, op. cit., p. 37. 
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These are the stakes and the context in which Selden here rejects Roman 
lawyers53 and demolishes natural reason as a potential source for international 
law, given the diversity of customs, the limited sphere of laws (e.g. mari-
time laws in landlocked countries are unhelpful, however reasonable those 
countries may be), and his observation that the natural reason that may 
emerge from a collation of customs cannot provide secondary rules whereby 
laws can be created, altered, or extinguished.54 In MC I.xxiv, Selden surveys 
post-Roman legal opinion on the matter. He agrees with Cujas, who finds 
some Roman law superseded by later custom, and rejects Gentili’s view of 
53) In DOS, I.xxiv.151 he cites Cujas’s rejection of Roman law when superseded later by 
custom. 
54) H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961). This is not to say that 
Selden’s limitation of the applicability of terra nullius informs all parts of the imperialist law 
built on MC. Trade and colonisation in the East Indies, for instance, were not discussed in 
terms of terra nullius, as indigenous regimes were generally perceived as valid negotiating 
partners. Charters in M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1926), pp. 94–98. However, given 
Selden’s emphasis on customary law, the historical genealogy of private and public property 
carries more weight in imperial justifications built on his legal theory than they do in those 
that rely on Grotius. The genealogy of terra nullius is thus more important for English 
than for Dutch imperialism. Terra nullius, however, served to justify British occupations 
of America, Australia and Africa. James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in 
Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Lesaffer, op. cit. Alternatively, one 
could argue that the distinction between “civilised” non-Christian and unoccupied lands 
was irrelevant, and terra nullius was a legal norm that emerged into lex lata from the practice 
of conquerors who claimed the lands even of peoples whom their lawyers deemed civilised, 
using symbolic acts and land markers that were theoretically appropriate only in terra nullius. 
Grotius’s distinction between dominium (private) property and imperium (jurisdiction) 
bridged the occupation of vacant land with the seizure of uncultivated but owned land. DIBP 
II.ii §17, II.iii §4, II.iii §19.2. To my knowledge this possibility of legal emergence (even 
constructivism), which dissolves the currently prized conundrum of the self-contradictions, 
hypocrisy and “justice” of early imperialism, has not been raised elsewhere. F.A. von der 
Heydte, ‘Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law,’ 
American Journal of International Law 29 (1935), pp. 448–471, at pp. 453–460. A.S. Keller et 
al, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts, 1400–1800 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1938). Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and English practices are compared 
in Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Note that this context refutes Fulton and 
others who regard pertinent details concerning historical acts of taking possesion in MC as 
mere digressions. Lesaffer, op. cit., p. 49 posits a similar legal transformation, of acquisitive 
prescription into effective occupation.
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Roman law as the law of nations and of nature. Selden’s arguments against 
Gentili, an Oxford law professor and fellow defender of English imperial 
interests, follow Cujas’s mos gallicus in showing abiding changes in custom 
from history.55 As he does with Rome, Selden at the end of MC I.xxiv denies 
that the tradition of legal opinion and scholarship is a viable source of law, 
because of its incoherence and carelessness.
Despite Selden’s skeptical onslaught, the natural-permissive law turns out 
not to be an empty category after all. Instead of consent and a comparative 
study of customs, Selden proposes to draw only on civilised nations of the 
past and present, and only on the expert testimony of historians and lawyers. 
In this context, “the people of Rome, the most noble precedent of all both 
for Law and Custom,”56 is a compelling source of customary international 
law. The practice of ancient Rome is a valuable historical precedent even 
when ancient Roman legal doctrines are fallacious.57 Roman Emperors 
55) In MC I.xxv Selden, as he did earlier with Cujas, sides with Alciato in rejecting both 
Roman law and most of legal scholarship. This supports Berman’s point that the gap between 
the legal philosophies of sixteenth-century common lawyers and civil lawyers has been 
exaggerated lately. H.T. Berman, ‘The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, 
Hale,’ The Yale Law Journal, 103:7 (1994), pp. 1651–1738, esp. 1657 n10. Berman’s criticism 
of Kelley’s emphasis on this gap parallels the criticism Ziskind levels at J.G.A. Pocock, The 
Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Cen-
tury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), for over-emphasising the insularity 
of English legal philosophy. M.A. Ziskind, ‘John Selden: Criticism and Affirmation of the 
Common Law Tradition,’ American Journal of Legal History 19:1 (1975), pp. 22–39. Helmholz, 
op. cit., offers a fine refutation of the thesis that common law replaced Roman law in early 
modern England. 
56) DOS, I.xiii.76.
57) I disagree with Paul Christianson, Discourse in History, Law and Governance in the Public 
Career of John Selden, 1610–1635 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 254–261, 
that Selden ‘deflated Roman law to a status inferior to international treaties and equal to other 
national laws.’ (p. 255). In Selden’s system of international common law, Rome remained the 
most important precedent. Compare Kingsbury and Straumann, op. cit., on the difference 
between the role Gentili and Selden assigned to Rome. Lesaffer’s emphasis on medieval and 
early modern uses of Roman law as ratio scripta underlines Selden’s deviation from the other 
end of the spectrum of Roman law’s authority as source of law. Selden neither “deflated” 
Roman law, nor treated it as straightforwardly authoritative ratio scripta. For Harrington’s 
adoption of this paradigm see Mark Somos, ‘Irenic Secularisation and the Hebrew Republic 
in Harrington’s Oceana,’ in Gaby Mahlberg and Dirk Wiemann (eds.), European Contexts 
for English Republicanism (Ashgate, 2013, forthcoming). 
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were regarded as lords of both land and sea, hence a valuable precedent for 
closed seas.58 
It is important to establish the perimeters Selden sets for the right use of 
reason. As we saw, reason cannot be “gather’d from the Customs of several 
Nations,” partly because “it hath often been most deservedly restrained” 
by religious precepts.59 Justinian and Gaius are wrong: the law of nations, 
observed by all, is not established and sustained by “natural reason.” Hence 
the need for expert testimony. Although Selden begins this chapter by mov-
ing from positive law (natural or divine) to permissive natural law only, 
when he includes nation-specific religious laws and the two Roman legal 
authorities in his discussion of the correct sphere of reason he also moves 
the category of law that is under examination back to positive divine and 
natural law. This is done in an orderly manner that makes it unlikely to be 
the result of confusion. Having refuted reason’s role in natural-permissive 
law, he continues by refuting it in the rest of natural law.
What are the consequences of this move? Four considerations jump out. 
Selden is not widely known for removing natural reason from the possible 
list of law’s sources. I suggest, however, that it tallies with his installation 
of Noahide precepts as a positive source of international law. Secondly, 
Selden’s presentation of Noahide precepts in De iure naturali et gentium, 
iuxta disciplinam Ebraeorum, libri septem (London, 1640, henceforth DIN) 
as a constitution for international law by virtue of their divine ordainment 
on the one hand, and hallowed historical observance on the other, owes 
much to Selden’s use of Noah and his sons in his imperialist redefinition 
of global property rights in MC. The third inference concerns secularisa-
tion. Fourthly, another key component for Selden in the precedent set by 
Rome for customary international law is popular sovereignty. Given MC’s 
original context as legal support for James VI/I, then for Charles I, this is 
unexpected, though given Selden’s parliamentary work, unsurprising. In 
various places of MC Selden states and strongly restates Rome’s power as 
precedent, and popular sovereignty as the foundation of Rome’s power. He 
weaves the two together subtly yet powerfully into a legal foundation for 
early modern imperialism that is broadly negotiated, e.g. in Parliament, 
rather than directed, as in Spain by Philip II, or as desired by several English 
58) DOS, I.xxii.143–5.
59) DOS, I.vii.42–3.
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monarchs.60 However, the limits Selden sets on reason also apply to public 
reason, which is limited by opinio iuris and parliamentary representation.
Assuming infallible universal reason, and appealing to it, is an obvious 
way of sidestepping religion. The two can be compatible, with reason as 
God’s or gods’ gift. If a priori superiority is given to reason in case they 
clash, reason is assumed to be infallible. Geometry and logic are often cited 
as paradigmatic in these models. Proponents of a strong theory of reason 
face a set of problems particular to them, ranging from the absence of 
empirical evidence for such reason (which can be countered by discussing 
the physiology of thought shared by all men, or by the self-evidentiality of 
mathematics) to man’s necessary deceptions by God (which cannot really 
be countered, unless to call them possible but insurmountable, therefore 
irrelevant, if true). In the passages Selden cites, Justinian and Gaius appeal 
to empirical evidence for infallible universal reason, namely the set of axioms 
common to all nations. Weaker varieties of the aggregate reasonableness 
theory include Machiavelli’s and Madison’s People, who are often wrong 
about small things, but never about the big; and some eighteenth-century 
formulations of “common sense” that posit a similarly omnipotent universal 
reason with a similarly limited sphere of applicability. All versions of this 
theory, however, assume that infallible universal reason is indeed universal, 
therefore can serve as the foundation for negotiation. The secularising effect 
of Grotius’s De veritate religionis Christianae (1627), for instance, derives from 
this assumption, which can only be maintained and extended to savages by 
rejecting rationalist arguments that support Christianity proper.61 Unlike 
today, however, seventeenth-century thinkers could argue that most men 
believed in one god or at least multiple gods, and those who did not were 
such aberrations that they, like the mentally disabled, could be ignored in 
reconstructing the nature and right sphere of reason.62 
Selden is suspicious of all this. His skepticism toward reason is shared by 
many believers, but given what he writes about religious laws in MC, that 
comparison does not say much about him. Selden does not argue that an 
examination of the religious laws of states, other than Israel’s, can indicate 
60) Harrington similarly weaves imperialism and popular sovereignty together inextricably. 
Somos, ‘Irenic.’ 
61) Compare Selden calling Erastus a new Copernicus. Tuck 1979, op. cit., p. 95.
62) E.g. John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration (London: Awnsham Churchill, 1690).
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what the natural law is. Neither does he argue that natural law can be 
deduced from a comparative study of religious laws, which allows for the 
imperfection of all states’ particularity and focuses on their commonalities 
as expressions of universal truth.63 Nor does he rely on reason, which must 
be deceived and contained by religion for the sake of public order.64 Unlike 
the harmonisers, or even the skeptical fideists, Selden removes both reason 
and religion from the list of reliable sources of natural law. The most obvi-
ous corroboration of his secularising reformulation of natural law is what 
he does with natural religion. 
Selden’s support for English mercantile capitalism rested on the secularisa-
tion of international law by displacing legal problems, like prescription or 
the types of private property, from the realm of divine law into the historical 
construction of law, encompassing all religious laws. To Adam and Noah, 
among others, God revealed his will, and the prospect of eternal life. Ac-
cording to Tuck this information, transmitted by the ‘historical continuity 
of human societies,’ changed the cost-benefit calculus of ‘the rational egotist,’ 
and turned pacta sunt servanda into a universal law.65 There are two problems 
with this account: Selden’s above-mentioned subversion of the link between 
ratio recta and ius naturale, and the implication that Selden’s system of law 
allows no colonial negotiation that depends on contract to be conducted 
without verifying the parties’ genealogical relationship to OT figures. Be-
fore signing a commercial treaty, an English merchant or conqueror would 
need to know whether a native ruler historically inherited the pacta sunt 
servanda awareness. In effect, the Iberian lawyers’ puzzle of diplomatic and 
commercial relations with non-Christians is replicated, albeit in a Judeo-
Christian, not only Catholic, form. 
Had Selden offered a systematic genealogy of all nations in order to 
categorise applicable and non-applicable legal instruments, he would have 
followed others on a well-worn path. The fact that he did not suggests a 
calculated openness on the matter. It is also worth noting that Selden’s 
weakening of reason can be easily accommodated by deleting the word 
63) In Bedford’s summary of this stance: ‘No religion is entirely devoid of truth.’ R.D. 
Bedford, The Defence of Truth: Herbert of Cherbury and the Seventeenth Century (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1979), p. 181.
64) DOS, I.vii.43.
65) Tuck 1979, op. cit., pp. 89–90.
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‘rational’ from Tuck’s account. It is enough to assume that people seek 
their self-interest (‘egotist’), and the good news about eternal life will con-
vince them to suspend disbelief in rewards and punishments for keeping 
or breaking promises. It is one thing to appeal to reason with a rhetori-
cal strategy (whether about reason, God, or both) and argue that society 
collapses without it, and another to appeal to individual self-interest. It 
is yet another thing to use either as a load-bearing component of a legal 
and political theory, as opposed to deploying them according to rhetorical 
rules designed to persuade the reader.66 If Selden assumed the priority of 
self-interest, as Tuck suggests,67 then it is not the appeal to reason that will 
convince the soldier not to desert, but his belief in duty, love of patria over 
self and family, and/or the ability of the organised state to protect his family 
best: eminently irrational beliefs, in short. The only thing an imperialist must 
convince his negotiating partner of, the unum necessarium in his rhetorical 
pilgrim’s purse, is the possibility of eternal life.68 
Selden’s displacement of the legal puzzles of early modern imperialism 
away from universal divine or natural law toward a historical account of 
the emergence and evolution of laws has several secularising consequences. 
First, it allows him to dismiss the Ten Commandments as natural law, and 
reclassify them as historically specific to the Jews at a given time.69 This is a 
notable coup in the context of seventeenth-century imperial legal debates. 
Selden’s disagreement in MC with those who saw Judaism as superseded 
by Christianity, and with those who thought that formulations of universal 
truths pre-date the Rabbis,70 set him up perfectly for his leitmotiv in DIN. 
Second, and also connecting the 1635 MC to the 1640 DIN, it also leads 
him to identify the Noahide Precepts as an historically recognisable instance 
66) Ioannis Evrigenis, Images of Anarchy: Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes’s States of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
67) Tuck 1979, op. cit., pp. 96–97.
68) This is the underlying message of Grotius’s De veritate, and the key to its efficacy as a 
sailors’, merchants’ and administrators’ manual for imperial encounters.
69) Cf. Hugo Grotius, Sensus librorum sex quos pro veritate religionis Christianae (Leiden: 
Johannes Maire, 1627), V.vii. Idem, DIBP I.xvi, and J. Barbeyrac, note 11 to DIBP I.xvi.4, in 
ed. Barbeyrac, Grotius, Le droit de la guerre, et de la paix (Amsterdam, 1724), 60–61. Recent 
edition of the 1738 English translation is Richard Tuck, Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 
(Liberty, 2005), I.170–1. Also see Somos, ‘Irenic,’ II.3.
70) Bedford, op. cit., p. 183.
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when divine positive laws were revealed and applied to all men, before 
human expansion across the world and the fog of history made property 
relations complicated, creating the need to revisit this historical instance 
for guidance. Thirdly, given Selden’s notion of evolving laws, the Noahide 
Precepts may not be always binding, either. 71 
Appreciating Selden’s view of customary law as the ideal receptacle for the 
live force that is history sheds light on his move from Roman, to comparative, 
to English, to international law. Selden regards binding international law as 
the set of laws in force at a given time due to historical traditions, ranging 
from the effectiveness of their enforcement (which is a realist argument72) 
to the reformulation of Roman law as binding due to past achievements. 
MC is a good starting point for the international law of mercantile capital-
ism and the British Empire not only because historical events bear out this 
association, but also because it is a self-aware announcement of an histori-
cal moment when England comes to uniquely embody, and becomes the 
source of, right international law. The originality of Selden’s transposition 
of the doctrine of the uniqueness and superiority of English law into the 
realm of international law is unaffected by pointing out that he drew on a 
great tradition of presenting English common law as unique and superior 
to others, due to its self-aware historical and customary nature. Among 
other such praises, Chapters XV (“That all Lawes are the law of nature, 
customes, or statutes”), XVI (“The Law of nature in all countries, is all 
one”) and XVII (“The Customes of England are of most ancient antiquitie, 
practised and received of v. [5] severall Nations, from one to another, by 
succession”) of Fortescue’s De laudibus legum Angliae (1463?), republished 
with an English translation and Selden’s commentary in 1616, foreshadows 
Selden’s proposal of historical British sovereignty over all seas as the most 
compelling law of nations.
This is why, after MC Book I ends with Selden’s rejection of reason, Ro-
man law, and opinio iuris as valid sources of international law, he stakes his 
proof of exclusive British sovereignty over the seas on the historical claim 
that such effective dominion has always existed, uninterrupted. Selden’s is 
71) This is the direction taken in H. Stubbe, An Essay in Defence of the Good Old Cause 
(London, 1659), pp. 15 and 106–132.
72) See Fulton, op. cit., p. 371 for Selden’s realism. In MC II.ii Selden agrees with Grotius, 
DIBP II.iii.11, on the necessity of an external act in legitimate occupation, and the insuf-
ficiency of the mental act alone. This, however, is far from being the sum of Selden’s realism. 
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a modern framework for assessing sovereignty and statehood, endogenising 
historical, even ethnic change. It contrasts with chosen nation theories as 
much as with “ancient constitutionalist” models. Book II.i promises that 
Then it shall bee shewn, from all Antiquitie, down to our times without 
interruption, that those, who by reason of so frequent alterations of the state 
of Affairs, have reigned here, whether Britains, Romans, Saxons, Danes, and 
Normans, and so the following Kings (each one according to the various 
latitude of his Empire) have enjoined the Dominion of that Sea by perpetual 
occupation, that is to say, by using and enjoying it as their own after a peculiar 
manner, as an undoubted portion either of the whole bodie of the estate of 
the British Empire, or of som part thereof, according to the state and condi-
tion of such as have ruled it; or as an inseparable appendant of this Land.73
The sovereign imperium over the seas that Selden sets out to prove is attached 
to the land, not to a dynasty, race, language group, or a chain of successive 
polities that claimed continuity. Selden was content to propose a history-
based legal argument that even encompassed regimes, like the Normans, 
that were keen to emphasise discontinuity from their predecessors. It is here, 
at the beginning of MC II, that we learn that Selden defines “British” from 
historical usage (starting with Caesar’s), regardless of the changing sover-
eignties of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland. Similarly, his definition 
of Britain’s territory combines a geographical description with a survey of 
Greek, Roman, Arabic and Byzantinian historical sources that discuss the 
coastline, seas, and associated islands. Having thus established the state’s 
territorial contours, Selden promises that in the rest of Book II he will
set forth the antient Occupation, together with the long and continued posses-
sion of every Sea in particular, since the Norman’s time; whereby the true and 
lawful Dominion and Customs of the Sea, which are the subject of our Dis-
cours, may bee drawn down, as it were by a twin’d thred, until our own times.74
Selden’s method of establishing both British geography and law relies on 
collating sources in several languages along a continuous historical timeline. 
73) DOS, II.i.182.
74) DOS, II.i.187.
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Berman describes this as Selden’s “historicity:” ‘He carried Coke’s histori-
cism one giant step beyond the conception of an immemorial past and an 
unchangeable fundamental law to the conception of an evolutionary past 
and an evolving fundamental law.’75 While true, this fails to capture Selden’s 
radical emphasis on the constructive and limiting potentials of history. His 
method owes more to Scaliger’s elevation of history into a ‘master discipline’ 
than either to Coke or the mos gallicus.76 In MC in particular, Selden consist-
ently offers historical arguments for naval defense, fishing, and trade, as ab 
initio and uninterrupted British custom of sovereign imperium over the seas. 
His adaptation of history as a master discipline to his scheme of law’s 
sources is the reason why his attribution of particular degrees of historical 
credibility to particular sources is significant. The historicisation of biblical 
precepts, for instance, that Grotius uses to transform universal into particular 
commands, becomes less available to Selden as a secularising technique, 
the more he invokes the causal connection between history, precedent or 
custom, and law. Instead, Selden can deploy another secularising technique 
to which the Leiden Circle made a defining contribution, namely the relega-
tion of aspects of Christianity, including the Creation, Abraham and Noah, 
to the realm of myth. Myths are valuable, but require an historian to apply 
interpretative techniques beyond the historical range, such as the evaluation 
of an author’s veracity, bias, method, proximity to events reported, use of 
sources, and so forth. Assessing Christian stories as myths in turn allows 
Selden to debunk exclusive Christian legitimacy claims, including papal 
cognisance over discoveries, and rulers’ right to send missionaries and build 
garrisons to protect them. 
II.3. Reconstructing Sources of Law
II.3.1. The Bible Becomes Fable
Selden’s strategy in MC I.viii is to rehabilitate the value of fables and myths, 
address and refute the accusation that this opens the door to atheism, and 
then to turn Genesis, including the account of the origins of private property 
he earlier based on it, into a fable. While this secularises insofar as it denies 
the literal truth of the Bible, one should note that Selden’s insistence that 
75) Berman, op. cit., p. 1695.
76) Somos, op. cit., chapters I-II.
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fables are subject to rigorous historical analysis leads him not to reject but 
to re-examine the historical foundations of the Bible. MC I.viii begins by 
establishing criteria that allow the addition of poets and myths to the range 
of sources from which the natural-permissive law of nations can be drawn. 
Like Scaliger, Hobbes and Vossius, Selden divides history into the Fabulous 
and the Historical Age. By the former he means not Varro’s pre-Olympic 
times, but “that which is obscured onely by the most antient Fables, at least 
under a fabulous Representation.” He first tackles the Fabulous.
But in applying our selvs unto the fabulous Age, wee do not ground Arguments 
upon Fables, as they are meer Fables; but wee manifest Historical Truth out 
of the most antient Historians, though wrap’t up in the mysteries of Heathen 
Priests and Poëts.77
While this view is best known from Augustine, Selden cites Lactantius in-
stead in both De diis Syris (1617) and MC. Lactantius is notoriously more 
forgiving than Augustine toward not only pagan philosophy but also pagan 
religions.78 Renaissance and early modern Neoplatonists, including Ficino, 
Mirandola and Cherbury, chose Lactantius as their patron saint because his 
appreciation of pagan religions extended a shield against theological objec-
tions. Lactantius was something of an untouchable for Luther, Calvin and 
other reformers, whose extensive commentaries on Augustine informed 
potentially always and actually often violent sectarian debates among 
Protestants.79 Seventeenth-century Englishmen were equally susceptible to 
charges of wandering beyond the acceptable, even into atheism.80
Though Selden draws heavily on Lactantius, he does so for a different 
purpose than Neoplatonic syncretists. He quotes from Div. Inst. I.xi:
77) DOS, I.viii.47.
78) In contrast with Lactantius, Augustine criticises several times the justifications of pagan 
poets as historical or prophetic precursors to Christianity. See e.g. City of God, XVIII.14. One 
possible reason is that the period between these two Church Fathers saw Julian’s turn against 
Christianity. F.E. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge, 
1964), pp. 58–60.
79) See e.g. Yates, op. cit., pp. 6–9, 18, 26–27, 36, 42–43, 83, 85–86, 143, 310, 364, 384–385, 
399, 401.
80) Michael Hunter, ‘The Problem of “Atheism” in Early Modern England,’ Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society 35 (1985), pp. 135–157.
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Nam etiam Vera sunt quae loquuntur Poetae (ut rectè Lactantius) sed obtentu 
aliquo specieque velata. Et sic veritatem mendacio velaverunt, ut Veritas ipsa 
persuasioni publicae nihil derogares.81 
This passage is interesting for two reasons. First, it never appears in Lactantius 
in this form. Beside minor adaptations, Selden moves the second sentence, 
originally in Div. Inst. I.xi.4, after the first, originally in Div. Inst. I.xi.5.82 
The context of the first sentence (the second in Selden’s citation) is Lactan-
tius showing that the poets must be transferring an obscured but truthful 
fact about Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, who agreed to a division by lot, to 
hold the heaven, the sea and the nether regions, respectively. As land is 
not mentioned, Lactantius argues, the deal must have taken place on land. 
Heaven, sea and the underworld must refer to geographical regions, and the 
gods emerged from historical figures. The parallel with Noah’s sons, whom 
Selden discusses immediately before and after this Lactantius mis-citation 
in MC, is irresistible. Selden indicates from the start the historical kernel 
and fabulous character of the biblical story. It also reminds the reader of 
the start of the previous chapter, where Selden wrote that both Jewish and 
Christian religious government is necessarily deceitful, in order to protect 
public order from the inquisitiveness of all human reason. 
Selden summarises Lactantius’s argument and concludes that both land 
and sea were distributed by a historical agreement. He cites Euhemerus 
in support, recorded and translated by Ennius, and also referenced by 
Lactantius. According to Selden, the writings of Euhemerus and Ennius’s 
translation were destroyed by the priests, who also accused Euhemerus, Di-
agoras and others of atheism. The echo of Selden’s own treatment after the 
scandalous History of Tithes is hard to miss in this bitter passage. The next 
key move, the application of mythographical instruments to the Bible, hap-
pens not under the aegis of Lactantius but a lawyer, Selden’s contemporary. 
81) MC, I.viii, 33. “For (as Lactantius saith well) even Those things which the Poëts speak are 
true, but cover’d under a certain veil or Figure. And yet they have so veiled the Truth with Fic-
tion, that the Truth it self might not take off from the common belief of the People.” DOS, 47.
82) The originals read: “Sic veritatem mendacio velaverunt, ut veritas ipsa persuasioni publicae 
nihil derogaret.” And several sentences down: “Vera sunt ergo quae loquuntur poetae, sed 
obtentu aliquo specieque velata.”
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Joannes Gryphiander (1580–1652) is seen as a pioneer both in adapting 
Roman law to modern conditions, and pointing out its limitations.83 In 
Tractatus de insulis (1623) Gryphiander argues that prescription requires 
discovery (invenire) and actual occupation (corporalis apprehensio), reducing 
the complexity of the matter that Selden first touched on when he referred 
to Aerodius’s discussion of the controversy surrounding the capture of 
Acanthus, where one Greek ran bodily to the gate to claim the abandoned 
city, while the other threw a javelin into it.84 Discussing the fabulous age, 
Selden invokes Gryphiander’s use of Homer’s lines on Neptune.85 Selden 
here reveals that following Lactantius’s debunking of fables it is not he, as 
implied earlier,86 but Gryphiander who equates the three Greek gods, Jupiter, 
Neptune and Pluto, with Noah’s three sons.87 Selden can now explicitly call 
Genesis 10 a fable (in fabula illa).88 Both sets of brothers fall prey to the 
debunking principle:
Other matters there are in the fabulous time, which beeing spoken of the 
Gods, may seem to shew, what opinion the Antients were of touching the 
right and custom of men in this particular. For, when they cloth their Gods 
with the persons of men, they commonly speak such things of them as belong 
unto men.89
Selden’s parliamentarianism remains evident in this crucial debunk-
ing move, in which sovereignty is transferred from gods and rulers to the 
83) Pioneer in adapting: J. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1927), pp. 115 ff. Schmitt, op. cit., p. 138, n. 7. A.S. Brett, Changes of State: 
Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2011), pp. 222–225.
84) DOS, I.iv.21–2.
85) Gryphiander, De insulis tractatus, ex iurisconsultis, politicis, historicis et philologis collectus 
(Frankfurt, 1623), XXXI §74, p. 490.
86) MC I.viii, 47.
87) Gryphiander, op. cit., XXXI §75.
88) This elaborate process of neutralising Genesis in MC I.viii complements Selden’s refusal 
in MC II.ii to consider non-biblical historical sources, which pre-date Julius Caeasar, because 
they are ‘too obscured with Fables.’ DOS, II.ii.189. 
89) DOS, I.viii.52. MC I.viii.36. See R.H. Popkin, ‘The Crisis of Polytheism and the An-
swers of Vossius, Cudworth, and Newton,’ in J.E. Force and R.H. Popkin (eds), Essays on 
the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton’s Theology (Kluwer, 1990), pp. 27–42.
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people. Selden criticises Lactantius for comparing Neptune with Pompey 
(though Lactantius’s comparison was with Mark Anthony), not with ‘the 
People of Rome.’ 
II.3.2. History Becomes Law
Selden begins his account of public dominion over the sea in historical times 
with the Cretans. He carefully shows that historical dominion covers the 
right to make rules, collect tolls, and control the number of ships on the 
sea. Minos, king of Crete, set a precedent when he took first possession “of 
that part which was not yet possessed but remained vacant (from whence 
this kind of Dominion doth arise).”90 Selden takes care not to contradict his 
earlier statements concerning Adam’s and Noah’s dominion, Noah’s transfer 
of full title to his sons, all men’s communal property in use and fruits, and 
their ability to claim private property in some unspecified way. However, 
he does not offer a coherent account of the transition from ‘fabulous’ to 
historical time, nor an explanation of how some parts of the sea remained 
vacant after the world was divided among Noah’s three sons. 
It is notable that he does not engage in the competing mythical genealo-
gies beloved by his contemporary peers. The most straightforward, and at 
the time usual, option for Selden would have been to make a direct claim 
to British dominion over the sea by tracing Noah’s sons’ genealogy to a 
mythical English government.91 Given Selden’s secularising agenda, it was 
good strategy as well as good scholarship to avoid religious partisanship. It 
would have also undermined Selden’s view of law as a changing and evolving 
corpus. It would have, however, made it much easier to support the claim 
that not only had Britain full title over the seas, but at the time of writing 
it was the only state in the world to have this sort of dominion. The dif-
ficulties of making this claim were greater than the Spanish and Portuguese 
claims, even in their extreme form. In addition to millenarian, chosen na-
tion and other exclusivist claims, the Iberians had papal bulls in support.92 
90) DOS, I.ix.54.
91) See e.g. Armitage, Ideological, 81–90, on Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His 
Pilgrimes, published in 1625. 
92) Summarised in W.G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (revised ed., Berlin: Gruyter, 
2000), pp. 233–237. Von der Heydte, op. cit., p. 451 is right to point out that the legal issue 
of papal donations precedes Alexander VI’s famous bull Inter caetera (1493). To be able to 
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The opportunity cost of Selden’s eschewal of religious partisanship and his 
refusal to offer a nationalist biblical exegesis in MC was considerable.93
II.4. The New, Imperialist Public Law of Nations
Selden in England writes in favour of dominion over the sea. Let the Dutch 
answer. I am now concerned with Swedish affairs.94
Grotius, letter to Du May, 10 Aug. 1635
II.4.1. Free Trade
The two main lines of argument in MC sketched out above, namely the 
Bible’s neutralisation and closed seas, unite in Selden’s position on free and 
unfree trade. He engages the Bible-based legal tradition directly. A conven-
tional locus on free trade was Num. 21:21–35, the war of Israel against the 
Amorites. The question is whether the war was just, given that Israel was 
denied right-of-way. Selden refers to Gratian’s famous Causa 23, Quest. 
II and III, which commented on Augustine’s justification of the war and 
became a key commonplace for medieval and early modern treatments of 
just war.95 Selden adds the reference to Grotius, DIBP II ii.§13. Grotius is 
discussing here the capacity of rivers to be subjects of private dominion. 
If considered territorially, they are subject to the sovereign. If seen as run-
ning water, their use must be free, like lighting one’s candle from another’s. 
Grotius draws from this the right of free passage over both land and water 
in case of necessity, such as expulsion, travelling to a land for rightful 
specifically ignore papal donations in the New World, Selden could turn at least as far back 
as Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357), whose ‘De insulis’ was reprinted numerous times in 
Consilia, quaestiones et tractatus (e.g. Venice, 1593, vol. 10, pp. 137–141). Selden’s sometimes 
explicit, sometimes implicit insistence on effectiveness as a precondition of de iure occupa-
tion, which allowed him to sidestep much of the New World problematic, could have come 
from the same Bartolus treatise.
93) For Ronsard, Hotman, Becanus and others who derived such theories of exceptionalism 
see Maurice Olender, ‘Europe, or How to Escape Babel,’ History and Theory 33:4 (1994), pp. 
5–25.
94) Grotius, [n.a.] Briefwisseling, 2227.
95) References in F.H. Russell, Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), pp. 21–22, 64, 72–73, 91, 100, 221–222, 225.
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occupation, commerce, and just war. Grotius’s account of Israel’s war against 
the Amorites occurs in this context. His use of Num. 21 here is criticised 
by Barbeyrac, because Sihon not only forbade passage, but marched out 
against Israel; and because
as GOD had given them the Land of Canaan, with express Orders, not only 
to destroy the seven accursed Nations, but also to combat all Opposition to 
the Execution of the Designs of Heaven, their Case was extraordinary, and 
such as cannot reasonably give Occasion to a general Rule for deciding the 
Question in hand.96
This was a shrewd analysis of one method with which Grotius subverted 
the Bible’s use in international law. Welwod pointed out another, namely 
the elimination of Scripture as an acceptable source of international law.97 
Unlike Barbeyrac, Selden accepts this Grotian claim as a methodologically 
valid legal proposition. After adopting Grotius’s inversion of universal and 
particular laws, Selden next refers to Gentili, Bodin, Vitoria, Solórzano, 
Molina and others, because this passage from Num., and the just war argu-
ments built on it, played a prominent role in framing the early colonial legal 
debate over the right of merchants and evangelists, including their access 
to the Indies. In Selden’s review of the literature not only the rejection of 
missionaries, but the denial of commerce was also used to justify Spanish 
conquest.
Selden raises two objections to the argument that this was a just war 
against the Amorites, who denied Israel right-of-way. First, private domin-
ion over the land was not affected by the issue. Second, free passage is not 
a positive, and its denial is not a negative, externality. 
And for any man to allege here, what is commonly talked, of the lighting 
of one Candle by another, of the not denying a common use of Water, and 
other things of that nature, it is plainly to give over the disquisition of Law 
and Right, to insist upon that of Charitie.98
96) J. Barbeyrac, note 3 to DIBP II.ii §13, in ed. Barbeyrac, Grotius, op. cit., 236. Also Tuck, 
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 440 n3.
97) Somos, op. cit., pp. 388–391. 
98) DOS, I.xx.124.
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Selden here is responding to Grotius’s use of the same references and images 
in DIBP II.ii, referred to earlier in MC I.xx. Here, Selden effectively lumps 
Grotius together with the Iberian lawyers.99 Against Grotius he pits Gentili, 
who is right to say that Reason of State trumps charity, and Gratian and 
Augustine would be right only if there were no possibility that a passing 
army could do damage.100 Selden shows that customary international law 
recognises this condition by citing one treaty, namely the 1609 Treaty of 
Antwerp between Spain and the Netherlands, in preparation for which ML 
was published!101 The provisions about the contracting parties’ right to ban 
access in order to avoid fear and jealousy, Selden points out smugly, support 
his point that dominion entails discretion over granting access to merchants, 
Christian proselytisers, and all strangers. He brings in Aristotle’s Politics 
VII.6 and several passages from Bodin’s De republica to corroborate that this 
right is a part of sovereignty, and to refute Vitoria’s justification of Spanish 
conquest ‘for a denial of commerce.’102 Selden writes that Juan de Solórzano 
Pereira (1575–1654) follows Vitoria in this respect. Solórzano appears again 
when Selden lists other Spanish justifications for their conquests: “For, they 
pretend also a Right of Discoverie, primarie occupation, Conversion to the 
Faith, and other things of that nature, besides the Donation of the Pope. Of 
all which, Solorzanus treats at large.”103
Solórzano’s De Indiarum iure, sive de iusta Indiarum Occidentalium in-
quisitione, acquisitione, & Retentione appeared in two volumes, the first in 
1629, the second in 1639.104 Current assessments of Solórzano vary widely. 
99) Though Selden does not give this reference, compare Grotius with Francisco de Vitoria, 
De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones, Ernest Nys (ed.), J.P. Bate (tr.) (New York: Carnegie, ([1555] 
1917), pp. 151–155. Pace Anghie, op. cit., the ineliminably religious character of Vitorian free trade 
doctrine is noted i.a. by Lesaffer, op. cit., Ian Hunter, ‘Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: 
On the Critical History of the Law of Nature and Nations,’ in idem & Dorsett, S. (eds) Law 
and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 
pp. 11–30; and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Political Theology of Trade Law: the Scholastic 
Contribution,’ in Ulrich Fastenrath et al (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays 
in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Clarendon, 2011), pp. 90–112, at pp. 110–112.
100) Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Commentationes Tres (London: n.a., 1589), I §19. 
101) Grewe, op. cit., pp. 156–162.
102) DOS, I.xx.125. 
103) DOS, I.xx.126.
104) Selden’s reference to lib. 2. cap. 20. §55 must be wrong, because §55 has a different subject 
matter. Lib. 2. is unproblematic, as it is part of vol. 1.
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Alvares reads De Indiarum as prioritising papal authority above all other 
actual and possible justifications for Spanish and Portuguese conquest.105 
Muldoon regards Solórzano as a medieval just war lawyer hopelessly behind 
his more enlightened Salamanca and other neoscholastic Iberian peers, 
including Vitoria.106 Pagden portrays Solórzano as more radical than Las 
Casas or Vitoria, attributing a potential to American Indians to progress to 
a state wholly equiparant with that of Catholic Spaniards.107
Selden’s choice of Solórzano as Vitoria’s mouthpiece and the representative 
of Spanish claims deserves further study, as does his pitting of the author-
ity of the Salamanca Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535–1600) against Solórzano. 
Molina’s position on the right to traverse a sovereign’s land or sea without 
permission derives from his displacement of the divinely instituted fellow-
ship of men from the state into the church. In a post-Reformation tactical 
retrenchment of the church from politics, Molina argued that there was no 
political organisation in the original status naturae after the Fall, and that 
polities were man-made for purely temporal ends.108 There was no body of 
natural law that both had content detailed enough to include provisions for 
crossing another sovereign’s territory without permission, and override civil 
laws at the same time. Molina anchored trading rights in a supra-political 
natural law of nations, the same state of nature where Locke grounded origi-
nal property rights.109 Selden chose the Catholic thinkers for his contrast 
shrewdly. In secularising fashion he thereby suspended two considerations: 
the true nature of papal authority, and the reasonableness of Christianity. 
Contrasting Molina and Solórzano allowed Selden to focus the reader’s 
attention on the Spanish justifications of conquest with reference to the 
natural right to trade, and oppose it to mare clausum without having to 
consider the religion or reasonableness of non-Europeans. 
105) Claudia Alvares, Humanism After Colonialism (Bern, 2006), pp. 80–82.
106) James Muldoon, ‘Solórzano’s De indiarum iure: Applying a Medieval Theory of World 
Order in the Seventeenth Century,’ Journal of World History 2:1 (1991), pp. 29–45. 
107) Pagden, 1986, op. cit., p. 165.
108) J.H.M. Salmon, ‘Catholic Resistance Theory, Ultramontanism, and the Royalist Response, 
1580–1620,’ in J.H. Burns and M. Goldie (eds), The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 
1450–1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 219–253, at pp. 237–238. 
109) Compare Gabriel Vázquez: prescription is purely civil, and not a natural law. Therefore 
it cannot be used to settle disputes between states that acknowledge no common arbitrator. 
Fulton, op. cit., p. 341.
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Another useful piece of the puzzle is Selden’s difference from other critics 
of Grotius’s ML on this point. In De iusto imperio Lusitanorum Asiatico (1625) 
Freitas countered ML with the straightforward argument that natural law 
underpins all civil laws; natural law is universal; and its ultimate purpose is 
the welfare of all mankind. While Freitas and Molina both mounted Catho-
lic positions on trade, Freitas, like Selden, regarded the right to grant and 
revoke trading privileges as integral to sovereignty, which can be enjoyed 
by Christians or pagans alike. Here they both differed from Vitoria’s view 
of the providential nature of global trade, among nations that must learn 
to co-exist or suffer the consequences of imperfect self-sufficiency. Despite 
making trade integral to sovereignty, Freitas justifies Portuguese occupation 
from the papal delegation of the universal duty to proselytise, joined to the 
particular duty to gather allies against Islam.110 Another useful “compare 
and contrast” exercise is with Purchas who, unlike Selden, regarded the 
English as a new Israel, God’s chosen nation, ordained to spread Christian-
ity by imperial means. In Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 
published in 1625 like Grotius’s DIBP, Purchas drew on Vitoria to refute 
Iberian claims to just conquest, particularly because they failed to spread the 
faith.111 These contrasts economically adumbrate Selden’s radical originality, 
and difference from the range of imperial justifications that had a use of 
religious components in common. 
II.4.2. Colonisation
Selden is quick to point out Spanish and Portuguese hypocrisy in justify-
ing their conquest from denial of trade, and at the same time denying 
access to other European nations in both Indies.112 The implications of his 
counter-argument are worth drawing out. Selden effectively posits a global 
public order of sovereign nation-states with the capacity to own everything. 
When at the end of MC I.xx Selden traces free passage arrangements to 
particular contracts instead of universal law, he positions himself on the 
distinctly modern side of the legal historical debate raging at least since Carl 
Schmitt and Ulrich Scheuner. Schmitt famously argued that from an early 
modern European perspective, Raumausgrenzungen divided the world into 
110) Freitas, De iusto, cap. IX.
111) Armitage, op. cit., pp. 81–90.
112) DOS, I.xx.126.
324 Somos / Journal of the History of International Law 14 (2012) 287–330
geographically defined spheres of different types of international law. Eng-
land and Spain, France and Spain, Spain and the Netherlands could cogently 
agree that might was right in the New World, while keeping the State of 
Nature under civilised control in Europe. Admiralty courts of the offending 
state could and did award compensation, for instance, if the plaintiff could 
demonstrate that its ship was taken in the sphere of civilised international 
law. Scheuner, Reibstein, Alexandrowitz, Grewe and others raised distinct 
objections against this account, which emphasised the ‘lines of amity’ that 
were specified in numerous treaties between European colonial powers. 
While important, none of these objections are wholly convincing. As 
Grewe points out, Scheuner’s counter-examples to Schmitt come from a 
later historical period, Reibstein’s indignation is unsubstantiated, and Al-
exandrowicz’s work on European-Asian seventeenth-century treaties and 
customary law undermines Schmitt’s model indirectly at best. In my, rather 
than Grewe’s, interpretation it does so because while the account of reiter-
ated and evolving legal interaction between European and non-European 
powers is fascinating, it does not contradict the proposition that European 
treaty-making was often shaped by assumptions containing bias or assess-
ments of non-Europeans as ‘the other,’ thereby strengthening rather than 
weakening Schmitt’s model of distinct spheres. Grewe’s objections, in turn, 
are contradictory. On the one hand, he criticises Schmitt for ascribing too 
much coherence to systems of ‘lines of amity,’ which did not add up ‘to a 
philosophy of a geographically determined ius publicum europaeum.’ On the 
other hand, he argues that lines of amity did not affect rules of discovery or 
occupation. Instead,
they gave each nation a formless and geographically restricted right of self-
help beyond the line. This right of each State to enforce its supposed rights 
through the use of force was distinct from the formal ius ad bellum and the 
right to take reprisals. It had the effect of limiting the effectiveness of the 
peace treaties to Europe.
 The logic behind this limitation was to provide a shield for European peace 
against increasing conflicts overseas, and to protect the political balance of 
power from the impact of the unpredictably shifting pattern of forces there. 
The legal status of the overseas colonial sphere was not altered as a result.113
113) Grewe, op. cit., pp. 161–162.
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There are at least three problems with this objection. First, it contradicts 
Grewe’s other objection concerning the coherence of the new European-
made international law. Second, it effectively replicates Schmitt’s argument 
for distinct spheres. Finally, it ignores global theories of law developed in 
response to occupation and colonisation, and in anticipation of its continu-
ance. Grotius’s ML, DIBP and Selden’s MC and DIN are such. 
Lines remain essential tools for controlling new lands.114 Instead of lines 
of amity, Selden concentrates on the capacity of the whole world to be ter-
ritorially divided by latitudes, longitudes, and the geometry of triangles they 
enable. In MC I.xxii he praises the compass, and the reports of European 
settlers in America for furnishing and expanding the store of geographical 
information, on the basis of which private property can be demarked and 
occupied. It is after he points out the geometrical capacity of the world to 
be unambiguously divided that Selden reviews treaties and agreements that 
establish lines of amity. He cites a few cases to trace the legal custom from 
the treaty between Rome and Antiochus III of Syria to “the late Agreement 
betwixt the Kings of Great Britain and Spain” in 1630 before he turns to the 
bulls of Alexander VI.115 Selden does not question here the validity of these 
bulls, only cites the part that introduced “an imaginarie Line drawn from 
the Artick to the Antarctick Pole,” dividing the whole globe. Selden’s use of 
geographical lines, in sum, dovetails with his tracing of dominion back to 
Noah. The whole world is private property from the beginning, and land, 
sea and air are equally capable of being privately owned. The finite nature 
of these resources (and of Creation) is why it is naïve and erroneous to posit 
unalienable rights to perpetually hold some things in common (e.g., the 
deep seas), and why international law must assume scarcity as the default 
condition.
II.4.3. Imperial Law under Limited Resources
Earlier we saw Selden in MC I.xx reject the traditional argument that 
merchants’ passage across seas is just and cannot be hindered partly due to 
the common property of all mankind in the seas, and partly because such 
passage cannot injure the owner of the seas (even if there is one) in any way. 
114) Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 
1400–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
115) DOS, I.xxii.138 ff.
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In a modern and decidedly early-imperialist twist, in I.xxii Selden introduces 
the argument that seas are a finite resource. They are not like the burning 
candle from which another man can light his own without diminishing its 
flame. ‘Yea, the plentie of such seas is lessened every hour, no otherwise 
then that of Mines of Metal, Quarries of stone, or of Gardens, when their 
Treasures and Fruits are taken away.’116 Caesar came to Britain looking for 
pearls; pearls and fish are further cases of exhaustible maritime resources. 
‘Where then is that inexhaustible abundance of Commodities in the sea, 
which cannot bee impaired?’
The Sea (I suppose) is not more inexhaustible then the whole world. That is 
very much inferior to this, as a part is to the whole, in greatness and plenty. And 
therefore a Dominion of the Sea is not to bee opposed upon this accompt ….117
This is the final piece needed before Selden’s doctrine of closed seas came to 
serve early imperialism. In MC I.xxiii he begins to bring the pieces together 
by showing that ancient accounts of free and unhindered fishing prove not a 
positive or a customary universal law, but belong to an early stage of human 
history when charity ex officio humanitatis encouraged sharing, and only 
primitive technology discouraged those practices of private dominion over 
the sea that MC now codified as international law.118 
III. Conclusion and Future Directions
history devises reasons why the lessons of past empire do not apply to ours.
J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: Nisbet, 1902) 221
Selden has long been recognised as a key figure in legal history. However, 
some legal scholars, including Westlake, attribute Selden’s achievements 
to Grotius. Others give unclear or clear, but radically divergent, reasons 
116) DOS, I.xxii.141.
117) DOS, I.xxii.143.
118) This is the State of Nature point where Locke instead re-emphasises divine Workman-
ship, human Stewardship, civil society, and the labour component of property that they 
infer. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Awnsham Churchill, 1689).
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for Selden’s importance. This paper outlined Selden’s importance in a new 
light, as the father of modern imperialism. Five elements of Mare clausum 
were discussed: Selden’s redefinition of property as historically (not theo-
retically) always private; his neutralisation of the Bible in legal argument; 
his Scaliger-based reconfiguration of history into the highest source of law, 
furnishing colonial administrators, lawyers and statesmen with a historical 
sensitivity and soft imperialism toolkit with which to engage indigenous 
traditions; his pivotal replacement of the assumption of the co-existence 
of limited resources (land) with inexhaustible and uncontrollable resources 
(seas, air, fish and other natural goods) with the assumption of universally 
limited and controllable natural resources, together with the transformation 
of European sovereignty and colonial prescription claims that follows; and 
his argument that the customary law of nations supports Britain as the one 
and only legitimate claimant of dominion over all seas.119 
The contribution of Grotius’s Mare liberum to free trade arguments 
make his legacy enduringly relevant to colonialism and international law. 
One can also argue that Selden’s case for closed seas, and unique British 
dominion, is a meaningful starting-point to the legal history of British 
imperialism that ends, or even continues, with American hegemony. One 
could also feasibly maintain that Grotius’s appeal across religious divides 
is more formative of eighteenth-century international law than Selden’s 
development of the Noachide Precepts. Conversely, one could argue that 
international law was retheologised in the nineteenth century, and the 
ecumenist Christian evangelism that Europeans could accept from one 
another was closer to Selden than to Grotius. It is also valid to point out 
that the stadial theory in Grotius’s writings, including his Defensio capitis 
quinti Maris Liberi oppurgnati a Gulielmo Welwodo, and the openness of his 
system to the insertion of other stadial theories, made the new, secularised 
natural law eminently adaptable to different cultural and legal environments 
in the course of Western colonialism.
These debates point beyond this article. For present purposes, Selden’s 
impact on imperialism outweighs Grotius’s to the extent that first, Selden’s 
Mare clausum shaped legal justifications of state policy more than Grotius’s 
Mare liberum, and second, the British Empire, financed, expanded and 
119) Fulton, op. cit., p. 373: ‘The maritime sovereignty claimed by Selden for the kings of 
England was of the most absolute kind.’
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defended while Selden was its chief legal authority, outweighed and out-
lasted the Dutch Empire. While this argument at first may seem a reductio 
ad quasi-absurdum, it is hard to think of more salient criteria for assessing 
the de facto impact of a legal treatise on early modern, modern, and con-
temporary imperialism. 
It is important to recognise the limits of Grotius’s and Selden’s inter-
national law, and the differences between them. It nevertheless remains 
true that secularising manoeuvres allowed both to posit a natural law with 
universal applicability, regardless of Christian specificities. Moreover, their 
stadial theories were not open-ended. ‘White man’s burden’ raises different 
issues and tasks than evangelisation. In principle, however backward a people 
is, in a secularised system of international law it eventually attains equality 
with their wards, however dubious or accidental markers of civilisation 
are posited. If one must walk and talk like an Englishmen to be accepted 
as civilised, one eventually can. Joining a ‘chosen nation,’ or the Elect, is 
harder. Grotius in ML argued that all seas are free. Selden, including the 
end of Mare clausum I.xx discussed above, argued that they are all closed. 
Both legal arguments claim global validity, and both break with the strong 
embedded tradition of using biblical passages to do so. Grotius finds for 
the Israelites against God in the matter of having to give a formal decla-
ration of war when a de facto state of war already exists;120 and in Selden 
the Amorites were in their right to deny Israel passage. 
The new system proved extremely effective in securing non-European 
cooperation and saving the economic and ideological costs of non-secular 
commercial and colonial expansion. It created, structured, and maintained 
the British Empire before its nineteenth-century retheologisation.121 Identify-
ing its distinctive features only provides analytical categories for revisiting not 
only the strange success of the British Empire, but also the relative decline 
120) Interpretation of Deut. 20 in Grotius, De iure praedae, H.G. Hamaker (ed.) (The Hague, 
[1604?] 1868), p. 102.
121) Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, new ed., 2004). Alexandrowicz sets 
the same end date to the process of international law making through international treaties 
between Western and non-Western parties. Alexandrowicz, op. cit., p. 2; also p. 83. What I 
see as the nineteenth-century retheologisation of imperalism seems coterminous with Alex-
androwicz’s new West-centrism of international law, and Koskenniemi’s professionalisation 
of international law. 
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of Iberian Catholic imperialism and the rise of Enlightenment American, 
French, and Prussian exceptionalism.
While secularised hallmarks of civilisation represent a significant break 
with the Christian international law tradition, non-Christian stadial theories 
of progress were easily adaptable to secularised imperialism. Throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europeans could and did claim 
prescription and/or first valid discovery or occupation against indigenous 
groups that were deemed to have a lower form of production (e.g. nomadic), 
culture (e.g. no writing), or political system (e.g. anarchy, or monarchy). 
Similarly, there are numerous cases when the early modern secularisation 
of international law made it possible to accord full recognition to non-
Europeans’ right to property, territorially defined states, and sovereignty. 
It remains to be seen whether the nineteenth-century doctrinal turn in 
international law – discussed by Alexandrowicz, Grewe, Koskenniemi, 
and others, and paralleled by the resurgent missionary zeal of imperial 
powers previously careful to maintain a secular law idiom – continued at 
least in part the stages-based justification of imperialism (recall Kipling’s 
1899 “The White Man’s Burden”), or whether Victorian imperial evange-
lism constitutes a volte-face from almost three centuries of self-consciously 
secularising imperialist legal discourse, resurrecting in effect sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century Catholic justifications of imperialism. Without draw-
ing a comprehensive arc, one can begin a pointillist picture of this change 
by contrasting, for instance, Vattel’s (1758) criterion for being a member of 
the natural society of nations (namely a state’s own claim to govern itself by 
its own authority and laws)122 with post-Kant and post-Bentham elabora-
tions that the correct hallmark of civilisation is not self-determination but 
recognition by a club of nations, self-appointed as already civilised.123 If 
not Iberian Catholicism, then at least a common, minimalist Christianity 
then became a defining hallmark of civilisation in positive international 
law.124 Another open question is the relationship of this rechristianisation 
122) Emer de Vattel, Droit des gens; ou, Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et 
aux affaires des nations et des souverains (London: n.a., 1758), I.i §4.
123) Koskenniemi, 2004, op. cit.
124) C.H. Alexandrowicz, ‘Doctrinal Aspects of the Universality of the Law of Nations,’ 
British Year Book of International Law 37 (1961), pp. 506–515. 
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of public international law to post-Hegelian doctrines of recognition, as 
another hallmark of civilised statehood. 
In sum, considering Mare clausum as a ‘Seldenian moment’ has multiple 
advantages. It exposes the legal cornerstones of early British imperialism’s 
success, and provides analytical categories for revisiting both the decline of 
Iberian Catholic imperialism and the strange rise of Enlightenment Ameri-
can, French, and Prussian exceptionalism. It also throws into sharper relief 
three unclearly but intriguingly connected nineteenth-century imperial 
developments, namely the stadial theories of progress designed to classify 
state and non-state legal entities; the Western formulation of an ostensibly 
universal doctrine of recognition; and the rechristianisation of international 
law that underpinned imperial justifications of occupation, prescription, 
and war. 
